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Ⅰ．INTRODUCTION1
The 1992 Declaration of the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development 
?UNCED? ?hereinafter Rio Declaration?2 newly 
provides for the so-called fundamental principles of 
international environmental law, based on the 1972 
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on 
the Human Environment  ?UNCHE? ?hereinafter 
Stockholm Declaration?3. The precautionary 
principle4, the ?polluter-pays principle?5, the 
principle of public access, and the ?principle of 
common but differentiated responsibility? are, 
among others, regarded as those which have 
emerged in a comparatively short period of 
time and which continue to be in the process of 
being developed, covering a variety of practical 
contents6. In fact, it is not clear whether or not 
these principles practically mean more than the 
responsibility not to cause any damage to the 
environment of other States or of areas beyond 
national jurisdiction7, as is prescribed in Principle 
21 of the Stockholm Declaration8 and Principle 2 
of the Rio Declaration9 and is also pronounced by 
some recent judicial decisions10. 
 In particular, the precautionary principle 
?or precautionary approach?11 is being debated 
with respect to the range of its interpretation and 
binding nature, since the wording of the principle is 
widely open to interpretation, as follows: 
  Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not 
be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation.12
It is often said that the essence of this principle is 
?that of taking action to address an environmental 
threat ahead of a disaster?13. However, there 
has been a long debate with respect to the 
precise contents of the fundamental principles 
of international environmental law, and there 
seems to be no clear agreement in that regard14. 
For instance, predictability is necessary for both 
diligent actions carried out by States and their 
decision-making; however, in a case wherein 
it is necessary to impose the regulation of 
environmentally harmful activities and materials, a 
degree needed as scientific ?causal? evidence and 
the necessary measures are individual. Moreover, 
needless to say, analysing the theoretical role 
of the fundamental principles of international 
environmental law including the precautionary 
principle is one thing, applying and interpreting 
them in dispute15 settlement procedures is quite 
another.
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 This article aims to clarify the use and effectiveness of the fundamental principles in international environmental 
law, with special reference to the legal status of the precautionary principle. This principle is regarded as one of the cardinal 
principles pertaining to the overall protection of the environment in the contemporary legal system as a whole. However, 
despite its attractive roles in terms of preventing a possible environmental injury, the precautionary principle has by nature 
some limits as a legal principle of the fundamental norm-creating character in the settlement of disputes. This aspect is 
essentially derived from the inherent relation between science and law.
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 Keeping the above-mentioned in mind, this 
article first aims to consider, in the context of the 
settlement of international disputes, the role and 
limits of the precautionary principle which has been 
regarded as one of the most axiomatic principles 
in international environmental law. Second, it 
aims to examine the essential aspects which are 
inherent in the effectiveness of these fundamental 
principles.
Ⅱ ． D E B A T E S  A N D  P R A C T I C A L 
S ITUATIONS REGARDING THE 
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
1?Their Theoretical Role
The protection of the environment, first of all, 
makes it necessary to place as a legally protected 
interest a particular object and matter known as 
the ?environment?16. However, at present, in an 
attempt to ascertain this, the preparation of a 
new legal framework is a matter of urgency since 
the framework of the law of state responsibility, 
which is based on traditional international law and 
which principally copes with the result that has 
occurred.17 Thus, international environmental law 
has steadily developed on the basis of the essence 
of ?precaution? and ?prevention? as a common 
sense in the law-making process and some other 
forum in international society.
 The so-called precautionary principle 
has been wholly or partially enshrined in some 
international instruments18 concerning marine 
pollution19, international watercourses20, air 
pollution and climate change21, transboundary 
transaction of hazardous waste22, transboundary 
trade of endangered species23, and the conservation 
of the biodiversity24 and marine living resources25. 
However, the manner in which the precautionary 
pr inc ip le  i s  f o r mula ted  in  these  var ious 
instruments is very different. It is even argued that 
this ?proves that there is not one uniform concept 
of this principle?26.
 For example, Article 6 of the 1995 Agreement 
for the Implementation of the Provisions of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
relating to the Conservation and Management 
of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks ?hereinafter Fish Stocks Agreement? 
prescribes that, where there exist uncertainty, 
inaccuracy, or inappropriateness of information 
is accompanied, ?more due diligence? shall be 
employed and ?lack of full scientific information? 
shall not be the reason to postpone or fail to 
take conservation and management measures27. 
Article 1 of the 2000 Cartagena Protocol ?to 
the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity? 
on Biosafety confirms Principle 15 of the Rio 
Declaration, and Article 10 of the same Protocol 
provides that ??l?ack of scientific certainty due 
to insufficient relevant scientific information and 
knowledge regarding the extent of the potential 
adverse effects of a living modified organism on 
the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity in the Party of import, taking also into 
account risks to human health, shall not prevent 
that Party from taking a decision, as appropriate, 
with regard to the import of the living modified 
organism in question?28. Besides these conventional 
provisions, there are some cases where in domestic 
legal systems, the precautionary principle takes a 
concrete form in order to function as a part of law 
and regulations or a guide for policy29.
 I t  s e e m s  t h a t ,  w i t h  re s p e c t  t o  t h e 
fundamental environmental principles such as 
the precautionary principle, there are, largely 
speaking, the following roles to play30. First, these 
play the role of guidelines which require the 
elaboration and formulation of the environmental 
principles at the centre of which lies the idea 
of ?sustainable development?31, representing a 
common and similar approach that is currently 
provided for in most of the environmental treaties. 
Second, these principles, as guidelines for showing 
a certain direction to follow, accelerate hand-in-
hand the codification and progressive development 
of the environmental principles. Thus, they 
inform decision-makers of the policy targets to be 
implemented domestically so that there will be 
in their States compliance with the related rules 
and principles on international environmental 
law32. These points have been observed in the 
elaboration and sophistication of precautionary 
measures, specification of environmental impact 
assessment ?EIA?, consolidation of the institution 
of information, and consultation in the case of 
transboundary pollution.
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2?Their Practical Limits
 However, it is also important to pay attention 
to practical limits other than those mentioned 
above.
 ?1? Ambiguity and unclearness of the 
wording
 The precautionary principle has been 
enshrined in various ways as a provision in each 
treaty, although its typical version may be the 
wording in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration. 
Moreover, there seems to be a doubt with regard 
to whether or not the language and wording of the 
Rio Declaration is of any clear normative value33. 
 ?2?Vagueness and inconsistency
 The essential point of the precautionary 
principle lies in taking some action to cope with 
an environmental threat or risk prior to an actual 
disaster or damage, as is mentioned above34. It is 
argued, however, that while prevention35 applies 
to known threats, precaution applies to uncertain 
threats36. The measures to be taken and those to 
be avoided are normally decided on a case-by-case 
basis37. An attitude requiring a diligent response 
can lead to a non-permission or an injunction of 
the proposed activities. Since the precautionary 
principle lacks concreteness and consistency in 
the criteria or standard concerning precaution, it 
is, practically speaking, not a lawyer or a scientist 
but a decision-maker who eventually decides such 
details. 
 ?3?Practical utility and effectiveness
 In fact, there has been a long debate between 
the doctrine which argues that the precautionary 
principle in international environmental law has 
already become a part of customary international 
law, and the contrary doctrine. Eventually, this 
confronting situation of doctrines on the legal nature 
of the precautionary principle does not lead to a 
solution in practice, partially because it is argued 
that the confrontation is only ?academic?38. 
 It may be said that, in international case law, 
there has been no case in which a legal decision 
was made clearly based on the legal status of the 
precautionary principle or a case wherein the 
principle had been directly applied to resolve an 
international dispute39. None of the following cases, 
in their judgments, made any reference to the 
term or the concept of the precautionary principle, 
despite the confronting arguments in the written 
and/or oral procedures between the applicants 
and defendants40; the Case Concerning the Request 
for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance 
with Paragraph 63 of the Court?s Judgment of 20 
December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests ?New Zealand v. 
France? Case of 199541, the Gabč íkovo-Nagymaros 
Project Case ?Hungary/Slovakia? of 199742, the 
Beef Hormones Case of 199843, the Southern Bluefin 
Tuna Cases ?Provisional Measures? of 199944, the 
MOX Plant Case ?Provisional Measures? of 200345, 
and the Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay Case 
?Argentina v. Uruguay? ?Provisional Measures? of 
200746. 
 At the bottom of this issue lies the question of 
whether or not the precautionary principle can be a 
judicial norm at all. In the procedure of provisional 
measures47, for instance, the International Court of 
Justice ?ICJ? merely considered whether or not the 
burden of proof had been successfully discharged, 
to the degree that the Court was satisfied, in the 
light of the emergency-related requirements of the 
situation in question and the ?un?recoverability of 
rights in question. 
 It is noteworthy that the Order of provisional 
measures actually given is a precautionary 
approach by nature; it has thus been shown that 
the approach, which is ?inherent? in the concept 
of provisional measures48, can be meaningfully 
applied without examining whether or not the 
precautionary principle is customary international 
law. Moreover, it seems right to indicate that there 
is no agreement on the consequences, besides the 
reversal of the burden of proof, that may occur as a 
result of the implementation of the precautionary 
principle, and that it is not possible to judge at the 
stage of provisional measures, for example, the 
possible damage which accompanies a summary 
assessment of radioactivity49. 
 This being said, it may be assumed that, 
in the phase of  provisional  measures,  the 
precautionary principle, which may be the result 
of the inclusion of a judgment on the merits of 
the consideration of the rights breached, cannot 
be de facto applied while the contents of the 
precautionary principle, which presupposes the 
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ascertainment of status quo, may be reflected in 
the objectives of provisional measures50 because, 
??p?ending the final decision?51, the ?respective 
rights of either party?52 are to be preserved53. 
Ⅲ ． T H E  E S S E N C E  O F  T H E 
FUNDAMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES
The following are some of the points with respect 
to the essence of the fundamental principles in 
international environmental law: the contents of 
the legal interests of environmental protection, 
the methodology of its implementation, and the 
manner of its interpretation and application in the 
settlement of disputes54. In effect, terms such as 
environment and environmental protection depend 
on the provisions of each treaty and convention, 
and the objects and methods of regulation and 
protection in each treaty, accordingly, vary 
considerably. In particular, the case of dispute 
settlement involves the issue of whether or 
not a rule or a principle is of character such as 
a legal norm necessary to judge and adjudicate 
in a concrete case through the interpretation 
and application of the fundamental principles of 
international environmental law55. Regardless of 
whether or not it depends both on state practice 
and opino juris56, the essence of the precautionary 
principle is that the assessment of the harmful 
impact should be prudent and that better judgment 
concerning science should be made without 
excluding the possibility of a mistake or lack 
of knowledge57. However, explicit and specific 
indicators, such as the methodology of risk control 
?responsive measures? and the threshold level 
which accompany an evaluation and a judgment, 
must be individual. Whether a rule or a principle 
requires a certain action or the occurrence of a 
certain consequence cannot become uniformed or 
standardised as the contents of a principle.
 As regards the legal normativity58 described 
above, it seems that what matters in the long 
run is whether or not a rule or a principle is ?of 
a fundamentally norm-creating character such as 
could be regarded as forming the basis of a general 
rule of law?, as was pronounced in the North 
Sea Continental Shelf Cases59. It is against this 
character that the ICJ decided that the equidistance 
line ?median line? rule cannot become a general 
rule under international law in the delimitation of 
the EEZ or the continental shelf. Accordingly, at 
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law 
of the Sea ?UNCLOS III?, what was eventually 
agreed upon is the common and basic formula that 
the delimitation of the EEZ and of the continental 
shelf between States with opposite or adjacent 
coasts ?shall be effected by agreement on the basis 
of international law, as referred to in article 38 of 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in 
order to achieve an equitable solution?60. Thus, the 
terminology of the rule of the equidistance/median 
line disappeared from the text of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ?LOSC? 
and the equidistance/median line rule has not been 
given any priority in the subsequent series of the 
judgments in maritime delimitation cases at the 
ICJ and other tribunals61, being placed as a kind of 
method, approach in delimitation cases62. 
 In the light of these developments and case 
law, it is doubtful whether or not the precautionary 
principle is also ?of fundamentally norm-creating 
character? under international ?environmental? 
law; therefore, the prima facie reluctant and 
conservative position of judicial institutions ?the 
ICJ in particular?63 regarding the legal status of the 
precautionary principle can be construed as the 
one which takes into account the points mentioned 
above. 
 It is certainly true that a decision or an 
evaluation on the basis of the precautionary 
principle is cardinal as an option under a strategic 
policy or as a management measure in order to 
prevent irreparable and irreversible damage. No 
matter how important it may be under international 
environmental law, it is still vague whether the 
principle is a legal rule with a binding force or 
nothing more than a guideline which should be 
taken into consideration while taking measures 
under an environmental policy or regulation. On 
the contrary, it is unclear whether or not this can 
be originally possible.
 The development of international law with 
regard to the relationship between the advance 
of technology64 and the environmental protection 
closely related to it entails uncertainty65 and 
unforeseeability as well as the unavoidable time-
lag which follows after decision-making particularly 
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through negotiation66 between concerned parties. 
Therefore, the elaboration of international 
environmental law cannot avoid being a ?catch-
up? process, providing an aspect that does not 
necessarily suit the purpose of environmental 
protection requiring a prompt action. In reality, 
when a legal system cannot easily catch up with 
the development of science ?and technology?, 
economy, and society, the idea that is inherent 
in the precautionary principle which requires 
a prudent reaction and perspective towards a 
future containing uncertainty may, in the long run, 
possibly with its so-called chilling effect, compel 
developed countries and their corporations that 
challenge to be engaged in pioneering a market 
and reforming technology to become less positive 
or active with lower incentives. For example, the 
definition provided for the term ?continental shelf? 
in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental 
Shelf67 rapidly lost its raison d?être under the 
influence of technological innovation related to 
marine affairs and the change of international 
scene surrounding resource management. Finally, 
the definition developed into the one with far more 
complicated contents in the relevant provision 
in the LOSC68. This is a strong case to exemplify 
the condition under which law, in general, tardily 
follows the advance of science and technology69.
Ⅳ．CONCLUSION
 It may be possible for a court or a tribunal to 
give judgment at the stage of provisional measures 
that the contents which were aimed at under 
the precautionary principle can be brought about 
only by considering the graveness of a situation70, 
that is, urgency and recoverability of possible 
damage, which are the requirements to request 
for provisional measures, without going so far 
as to invoke the precautionary principle whose 
fundamental normativity is still in doubt. 
 Moreover, since the reversal of the burden 
of proof is the measures possibly taken under the 
policy of law-making, it is not only the procedural 
paradigm shift in relation to litigation but also any 
significant development of positive norms under 
international environmental law that will greatly 
influence the role of the fundamental principles 
of international environmental law71. However, 
it may be said that the reversal of the burden of 
proof is originally derived from the idea that those 
who engage in a potentially and environmentally 
harmful activity are due to show that no more 
damage to the environment will occur ?than legally 
regulated?. In this case, the reversal of the burden 
of proof might go so far as to forbid, in principle, 
those activities that might basically cause any 
environmentally adverse impact and, eventually, to 
permit exceptionally an activity only if one could 
successfully prove that no damage would take 
place.
 A judge per se at a judicial court or at an 
arbitral tribunal72 will have great difficulties in 
rendering a judgment or a decision for resource 
management  and/or  the protect ion of  the 
environment with a long perspective, even though 
he or she may be able to give an injunction on a 
short-term basis73. This is because, normally, he or 
she is not necessarily equipped with the necessary 
scientific knowledge or expertise to dispense 
justice74. A scientific approach, data, and information 
regarding the protection of the environment 
always entail uncertainty75. Accordingly, there may 
essentially be limits in the international ?judicial? 
institutions that govern the environmental 
protection whose essence is to preserve status quo 
from the viewpoint of prevention76. Under these 
conditions and requirements, the fundamental 
principles of international environmental law will 
significantly develop and take shape through the 
interaction between the addition of protocols and 
other related complementary instruments and 
the implementation of the domestic law system77, 
reflecting the conflicting interests between 
developed and developing countries ?or the North-
South problem78? and those among developed 
countries under the different situations of economy, 
science, and society.
 ?4 October 2007?
* This article is a fully revised and translated version of the 
oral presentation made by the author at the 11th Annual 
Conference of the Japan Association for Environmental 
Law and Policy, which was held on 10 June 2007 at Sophia 
University, Tokyo. A part of the research on this topic 
was funded by the Waseda University Special Research 
Grants of 2006 and 2007, respectively. I am also indebted 
to the service provided by the Library of the University of 
Sydney, School of Law.
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